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A β-core of Incomplete Information Games
UTSUMI, Yukihisa
1　Introduction
In the last three decades the economics of information has become one of the major 
areas of research. These ideas have been applied to the cooperative game theory in 
recent years such as Yannelis （1991）. In this paper we introduce cooperative games 
derived from a strategic form game with asymmetric information, and prove the 
existence of its β-core in the TU （Transferable Utility） game. 
The related work dates back to the famous economic situation introduced by Scarf 
（1971）. He applied Shapley and Shubik’s （1969） approach to n-person normal form 
games. He derived the NTU （Non Transferable Utility） game from an n-person normal 
form game, and verified the existence of an α-core, which is considered as a natural 
extension of core in the strategic game, in the NTU-game. Wilson （1978） added the 
notion of asymmetric information to this model, and proved the existence of the fine 
core in asymmetric market game. Yannelis （1991） extended Wilson’s model to the 
strategic form game with continuum states, and proved the non-emptiness of an α-core 
under uncertainty. 
On the contrary, the general existence of β-core, which is also considered as another 
natural extension of core in the strategic form game, bas been unknown for nearly forty 
years. Nakayama （1998） and Zhao （1999）, however, attempted to show the non-emptiness 
of β-core in the class of NTU and TU games. They assume respectively that each 
coalition has a punishment which is called a dominant punishing strategy, and that the 
characteristic function is strongly separable. They conclude that there exists the β-core, 
which is identical to an α-core, in the NTU or TU-game to be generated from a normal 
form game respectively. 
In this paper we progress one step ahead of their results. We investigate an incomplete 
information game instead of an n-person normal form game. In this incomplete information 
game, each player has different information and a private prior probability. One of the 
main contributions of our paper is to prove the existence of a β-core in the class of TU-
games which are derived from incomplete information games. This result is considered 
as an asymmetric information version of Nakayama （1998） and Zhao （1999）, and a β-core 
version of Yannelis （1991）. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. In section 3 
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we prove our results. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks. 
2　Definitions
Let us begin our analysis by describing an incomplete information game to be employed 
in this paper. 
definition 1: An incomplete information game is a system （N, Xi, ui, Ω, Fi, P）, where
（1）　N =　1,…,n is the set of players, 
（2）　（Ω, F, P） is a probability space, 
（3）　Fi ⊂ F is a sub σ-algebra, 
（4）　 Xi＝　xi∈L∞（Ω, �, P）| xi : Ω→    is �i -measurable  is the set of player i’s 
strategies, and
（5）　 ui : Ω×
n →  is player i’s Fi -measurable payoff function which is denoted by 
ui（ω, x）.
We consider Ω as the set of states. Condition 3 of definition 1 means that the σ
-algebra Fi is player i’s knowledge and the probability measure P is the common prior. 
As usual, we consider the conditional probability P（・|Fi） as player i’s subjective 
probability in this model. To simplify notations we define the subjective expected utility 
function Ui : Xi →i=1
n
, which is described as Ui（x）＝ ∫Ω ui（ω, x（ω））dPi（ω）, where Pi
＝P（・|Fi）. The measurability of condition 4 describes that each player can choose a 
strategy which he or she knows. 
definition 2 : A TU-game is characterized by a system （N, v）, where 
（1）　N =　1,…,n  is the set of players, and
（2）　v : 2N \ 0　→  is called a characteristic function. 
We shall let the subscripts in small letters to denote individual players, and the 
subscripts in capital letters to denote coalitions. As usual, let xS＝（xi ∈ Xi | i ∈ S）∈ Xi i∈s
be the strategies of a coalition S and x－ S＝（xi ∈ Xi |i ∈ N\S）∈ Xi i∈N\S be the strategies 
of the complementary coalition N\S. According to Ichiishi （1997）, we introduce some 
behavior rules in this TU-game using an incomplete information game. The 
characteristic function vβ: 2
N \ 0　→  is called a β-fashion in TU-games, if
i∈S
y－S xS
∑Ui（xs , y－s）=
i∈S
∑Ui（x*s（y－s）, y－s）,vβ（S）= min max ^ ^
where x＊S（y^－ S） is the best response to y^－ S . This characteristic function represents an 
optimistic behavior for coalitions, which players in coalition consider they can alwayes 
choose the optimail strategy to the opposite strategy for outside coalition. 
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A TU-game derived from an incomplete information game is called the β-TU game if 
v（S）＝vβ（S） for all S ∈ 2
N \ 0 .
definition 3 : The core of the TU-game （N, v） is the set of u* ∈ n of a utility vector 
satisfying
（1）　∑ni=1 u*i=v（N）,  and
（2）　∀S∈2N \　０　:∑i∈S u*i ≥ v（S）. 
If the characteristic function v is given by vβ, the core of the β-TU game （N, vβ） is 
called the β-core. 
In this paper we prove the non-emptiness of the β-core in the TU-game which is 
derived from an incomplete information game.
3　Results
proposition 1: Let （N, Xi, ui, Ω, Fi , P） be an incomplete information game. Suppose that 
（1）　Xi is convex and weakly compact, 
（2）　 for all ω ∈ Ω, ui（ω, ・） is concave on n and ui is integrably bounded on Ω, 
and
（3）　 ui（ω, x
＊
S（y^－ S）（ω）, y^－ S（ω））＝ y－S
minui（ω, x
＊
S（y^－ S）（ω）, y－S（ω））for all ω ∈ Ω and 
S ∈ 2N \ 0 .（1）
Then a β-core in the TU-game （N, vβ） is nonempty.
proof of proposition 1
The proof is divided into two steps. 
Step 1: Xi →i=1
n
Ui :  is a concave and continuous function.
concavity
For all x and y in Xii=1
n
 and for all t ∈（0, 1）,
（1） This condition is considered as an incomplete information version of Zhao’s （1999b） strong separability. 
It signifies that the outsider’s action which best punishes a coalition S at a state ω is also the action 
which best punishes each member of the coalition at a state ω. Nakayama （1998） also proposed a related 
condition, which was called a dominant punishing strategy, for an existence of a β-core in NTU-games. It 
means that each coalition has a punishment strategy to its opposite coalition. It is known that this 
condition is a little stronger than the previous one.
88─　 ─
Ui（tx＋（1－t）y）＝ ∫
Ω
 ui（ω, tx（ω）＋（1－t）y（ω））dPi（ω）
　　　　　　　　　　　≥ ∫
Ω
 tui（ω, x（ω））＋（1－t）ui（ω, y（ω））dPi（ω）
 （ui is concave）
 ＝ tUi（x）＋（1－t）Ui（y）.
continuity
Noting that ui is continuous on the interior of its domain because of the concavity of 
ui on n. Suppose that xn → x in Xii=1
n
. Since ||xn－x ||∞＝ess supω|xn（ω）－x（ω）|, it follows 
that xn（ω）→ x（ω）almost all ω. This implies that ui（ω, xn（ω））→ ui（ω, x（ω））almost all ω .
lim
n→∞
 Ui（xn）= limn→∞ ∫Ω ui（ω, xn（ω））dPi（ω）
 ＝ ∫
Ω
 lim
n→∞
 ui（ω, xn（ω））dPi（ω） （dCT）
 ＝ ∫
Ω
 ui（ω, x（ω））dPi（ω） （ui is continuous）
 ＝ Ui（x）
Step 2: ∀S∈2N \　０　:∑S∈� wS vβ（S）≤ vβ（N）for all balanced collection B
Before proving, it is convenient to introduce the following balanced collection. Let B
＝� =　T1,…,Tk  be a collection of coalitions. For each i ∈ T, B（i）＝ T ∈ � | i ∈ T  denotes 
the set of these coalitions of which i is a member. If there is nonnegative number wT for 
all T ∈B such that ∑T∈�（i）wT＝1 for all i ∈ N, B is called a balanced collection. It has 
been known by Bondareva-Shapley that the non-emptiness of the core in TU-games is 
equivalent to the balanced condition, that is ∀S∈2N \　０　:∑S∈� wS vβ（S）≤ vβ（N） for 
all balanced collection B. 
It follows that miny － s∑i∈S Ui（x＊S（y－S）, y－S） is lower semi-continuous, since Xi is 
weakly compact and Ui is a continuous function. For this reason, vβ is well defined. 
Noting that vβ（S）is given by ∑i∈S Ui（x＊S（y^－S）, y^－S）, where x＊S（y^－S）is the best response 
to y^－S , we check the balanced condition of Bondareva-Shapley.
∑
S∈�
wS vβ（S）=∑
S∈�
wS∑
i∈S
Ui（x
＊
S（y^－S）, y^－S）
 ＝∑
i=1
∑
S∈�（i）
n
wSUi（x
＊
S（y^－S）, y^－S）
 =∑
i=1
∑
S∈�（i）
n
wS ∫
Ω
 ui（ω, x
＊
S（y^－S）（ω）, y^－S（ω）dPi（ω）
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≤ ∑
i=1
∑
S∈�（i）
n
wS ∫
Ω
 ui（ω, x
＊
S（y^－S）（ω）, z－S（ω））dpi（ω）
 =∑
i=1
∑
S∈�（i）
n
wSUi（x
＊
S（y^－S）, z－S）
 ≤ ∑
i=1
∑
S∈�（i）
n
Ui（
i=1
∑
S∈�（i）
n
wS（x
＊
S（y^－S）, z－S））　 （the concavity of Ui）
 ≤ x∈∏
max
n
i=1 Xi
 ∑
i=1
∑
S∈�（i）
n
Ui（x）=vβ（N）.
Then, we can conclude the nonemptiness of β-core from Bondareva-Shapley’s theorem.
4　Concluding Remarks
We have established the existence of a β-core of an incomplete information game. 
The non-emptiness of an β-core requires （1） a payoff function is concave, and （2） 
player i’s strategy is Fi-measurable, and its set is convex and weakly compact （3） vb is 
the outside minimum strategy condition. This result may be considered as an 
asymmetric information version of Scarf （1971） and Zhao （1999a）. Our future topic is 
to introduce a learning model. To do so, we may analyze a selection of core allocations 
and a path of a core allocation. 
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─Abstract─
We prove an existence of an α-core and a β-core derived from an incomplete 
information game in which each player has different information. These results can be 
considered as an asymmetric information version of Zhao（1999）. 
